Failure detectors -oracles that provide information about process crashes -are an important abstraction for crash tolerance in distributed systems. Although current failuredetector theory provides great generality and expressiveness, it also poses significant challenges in developing a robust hierarchy of failure detectors. We address some of these challenges by proposing a variant of failure detectors called asynchronous failure detectors and an associated modeling framework. Unlike the traditional failure-detector framework, our framework eschews real time completely. We show that asynchronous failure detectors are sufficiently expressive to include several popular failure detectors. Additionally, we show that asynchronous failure detectors satisfy many desirable properties: they are self-implementable, guarantee that stronger asynchronous failure detectors solve more problems, and ensure that their outputs encode no information other than process crashes. We introduce the notion of a failure detector being representative of a problem to capture the idea that some problems encode the same information about process crashes as their weakest failure detectors do. We show that a large class of problems, called finite problems, do not have representative failure detectors.
INTRODUCTION
Failure detectors [5] are a popular mechanism for designing asynchronous distributed algorithms for crash-prone systems. Conceptually, they provide (potentially unreliable) information about process crashes in the system. This information may be leveraged by asynchronous algorithms for crash tolerance. Technically, failure detectors are specified by constraints on their possible outputs, called histories, relative to the actual process crashes in the system, called the fault pattern. The fault pattern is the 'reality', and the history is an 'approximation' of that reality. A failure detector is a function that maps every fault pattern (the 'reality') to a set of admissible histories (the 'approximations'). The stronger a failure detector is, the closer its admissible 'approximations' are to the 'reality'.
We explore the modeling choices made in the traditional failure-detector framework, and we focus on a variant of failure detectors called asynchronous failure detectors. We also offer an alternative modeling framework to study the properties of asynchronous failure detectors. Briefly, asynchronous failure detectors are a variant of failure detectors that can be specified without the use of real time, are self-implementable, and interact with the asynchronous processes unilaterally; in unilateral interaction, the failure detector provides outputs to the processes continually without any queries from the processes. We show that asynchronous failure detectors retain sufficient expressiveness to include many popular and realistic [7] failure detectors while satisfying several desirable properties.
Background and Motivation
The canonical works [5, 4] pioneered the theory of failure detectors. Results in [5] showed how sufficient information about process crashes can be encoded in failure detectors to solve problems in asynchronous systems. Complementary work in [4] showed that some information about crashes is actually necessary; in particular, they showed that Ω is a "weakest" failure detector to solve consensus in crash-prone asynchronous systems. Their proposed proof technique has been used to demonstrate weakest failure detectors for many problems in crash-prone asynchronous systems (cf. [8, 24, 11, 14] ). Recent results have shown that a large class of problems have a weakest failure detector [17] while yet another class of problems do not have a weakest failure detector [3] .
From a modeling perspective, failure detectors mark a departure from conventional descriptions of distributed systems. Conventionally, the behavior of all the entities in a distributed system model -processes, channels, and other entities -are either all asynchronous or are all constrained by the passage of real time. In contrast, in the failuredetector model, only the failure-detector behavior is constrained by real time, whereas the behavior of all other entities is asynchronous. The differences between the two styles of models have been the subject of recent work [6, 17] which has brought the theory of failure detectors under additional scrutiny. We discuss five aspects of failure-detector theory that remain unresolved: self-implementability, interaction mechanism, the kind of information provided by a failure detector, comparing failure-detector strengths, and the relationship between weakest failure detectors and partial synchrony.
Self-Implementability. Failure detectors need not be self-implementable. That is, there exist failure detectors (say) D such that it is not possible for any asynchronous distributed algorithm to implement an admissible behavior of D despite having access to the outputs from D. Since a failure detector D ′ is stronger then a failure detector D iff D ′ can implement D, we arrive at an unexpected result that a failure detector D need not be comparable to itself.
Jayanti et. al. resolve the issue of self-implementability in [17] by separating the notion of a failure detector from an implementation of a failure detector. A failure detector provides outputs to each process at each time instant, but a failure-detector implementation provides outputs only upon being queried. An implementation of a failure detector D is said to be correct if, for every query, the output of the implementation is a valid output of D for some time in the interval between the query and the output. In effect, the definition of "implementing a failure detector" in [17] collapses multiple classes of distinct failure detectors into a single equivalence class. 1 The broader impact of results from [17] on the landscape of failure-detector theory remains unexplored.
Interaction Mechanism. The mechanism proposed in [17] explicitly requires that failure-detector implementations interact with processes via a query-based interface. An alternative interface is one in which failure-detector implementations provide outputs to processes unilaterally and continually, without queries. To our knowledge, the motivation for choosing either interface has not been adequately elucidated despite non-trivial consequences of the choice. For instance, recall that self-implementability of a failure detector in [17] depends critically on the query-based interface. Also, the so-called 'lazy' implementations of failure detectors [10] depend on a query-based interface to ensure communication efficiency; an analogous optimization is not known with a unilateral interface. Therefore, the significance and consequences of the interaction model merit investigation.
Information About Crashes Alone. Whether or not failure detectors can provide information about events other than process crashes has a significant impact on the weakest failure detectors for problems such as Non-Blocking Atomic Commit [14, 15] and Uniform Reliable Broadcast [1, 16] . In order to restrict failure detectors to the ones that give 1 For example, consider the instantaneously perfect failure detector P + [6] which always outputs the exactly the set of crashed processes and the perfect failure detector P [5] which never suspects live processes and eventually and permanently suspects crashed processes. Under the definition of "implementing a failure detector" from [17] , an implementation of P + is indistinguishable from an implementation of P.
information only about crashes, the authors in [1] consider failure detectors that are exclusively a function of the fault pattern. In [14] , the authors further restrict the universe of failure detectors to timeless failure detectors, which provide information only about the set of processes that crash, and no information about when they crash. To our knowledge, the necessary and sufficient conditions for failure detectors to provide information about crashes alone remains unresolved.
Comparing Failure Detectors. Not all information provided by failure detectors may be useful in an asynchronous system. For instance, if a failure detector provides the current real-time in its outputs (in addition to other information), the processes cannot use this information because passage of real time is not modeled in an asynchronous system. Suppose Weakest Failure Detectors and Partial Synchrony. Failure detectors are often viewed as distributed objects that encode information about the temporal constraints on computation and communication necessary for their implementation; the popular perception is that several failure detectors are substitutable for partial synchrony in distributed systems [19, 21, 20] . Therefore, if a failure detector D is the weakest to solve a problem P , then a natural question follows: is the synchronism encoded in the outputs of D the minimal synchronism necessary to solve P in a crashprone partially synchronous system? Work to date suggests that the answer is affirmative for some problems [19, 22] and negative for others [6] . To our knowledge, there is no characterization of the problems for which the aforementioned question is answered in the affirmative or in the negative.
Summary. Based on our understanding of the state of the art, we see that failure-detector theory is a very general theory of crash tolerance with important results and novel methods. These results and methods provide a qualitative understanding of the amount of information about crashes necessary and sufficient to solve various problems in asynchronous systems. However, the generality of the theory makes it difficult to develop a robust hierarchy of failure detectors and to determine the relative hardness of solving problems in crash-prone asynchronous systems.
Contribution
In this paper, we examine a new variant of failure detectors called asynchronous failure detectors (AFDs) and we show that they satisfy many desirable properties. We define AFDs through a set of basic properties that we expect any "reasonable" failure detector to satisfy. We demonstrate the expressiveness of AFDs by defining many traditional failure detectors as AFDs. Restricting our focus to AFDs offers several advantages.
First, AFDs are self-implementable and their specification does not require real time. Therefore, unlike current failuredetector models, all the entities in the distributed system are asynchronous. In order to specify AFDs, we propose a new modeling framework that completely eschews real time, which allows us to view failure detectors as problems within the asynchronous model. This allows us to compare failure detectors as we compare problems; it also allows us to compare problems with failure detectors, and vice versa.
Second, AFDs provide outputs to the processes unilaterally, without queries. Therefore we preserve the advantages offered by the framework in [17] while ensuring failure detectors provide information only about process crashes.
Third, the hierarchy of AFDs ordered by their relative strength induces an analogous hierarchy of problems ordered by their relative hardness. In fact, if an AFD D is strictly stronger than another AFD D ′ , then we show that the set of problems solvable with D is a strict superset of the set of problems solvable by D.
Fourth, AFDs clarify a relationship between a weakest failure detector to solve a problem and the minimal synchronism that is necessary and sufficient to solve the same problem. We introduce the concept of representative AFDs for a problem. Briefly, an AFD D is "representative" of a problem P iff D is sufficient to solve P and D can be extracted from a (blackbox) solution to P . By construction, the synchronism encoded by the outputs of a representative AFD for a problem P is also the minimal synchronism sufficient to solve P . We show that finite problems (such as consensus and set agreement) do not have a representative AFD, but they have a weakest failure detector [17] .
I/O AUTOMATA
We use the I/O Automata framework [18] for specifying the system model and failure detectors. Briefly, in the I/O framework each component of a distributed system is modeled as a state machine, where different components interact with each other through input and output actions. This section provides an overview of I/O-Automata-related definitions used in this paper. See [18, Chapter 8] for a thorough description of the I/O Automata framework.
Definitions
An I/O automaton (or simply, an automaton) is a (possibly infinite) state machine. Formally, an I/O automaton consists of five components: a signature, a set of states, a set of initial states, a state-transition relation, and a set of tasks. We describe these components next.
Actions, Signature, and Tasks. The state transitions in an automaton are associated with named actions; the set of actions of an automaton A is denoted act(A). Actions are classified as input, output, or internal, and they constitute the signature of the automaton. The set of input, output, and internal actions of an automaton A are denoted input(A), output(A), and internal(A), respectively. Input and output actions are collectively called external actions, and output and internal actions are collectively called locally controlled actions. The locally controlled actions of an automaton are partitioned into tasks.
Internal actions of an automaton are visible only to the automaton itself whereas external actions are visible to other automata as well; automata interact with each other through external actions. Unlike locally controlled actions, input actions arrive from the outside and are assumed not to be under the automaton's control.
States. The set of states of an automaton A is denoted states(A). A non-empty subset init(A) ⊆ states(A) is designated to be the set of initial states.
State-Transition relation. The state transitions in an automaton A are restricted by a state-transition relation, denoted trans(A), which is a set of tuples of the form (s, a, s ′ ) where s, s ′ ∈ states(A) and a ∈ act(A). Each such tuple (s, a, s ′ ) is a transition, or a step, of A. For a given state s and an action a, if trans(A) has some step of the form (s, a, s ′ ), then a is said to be enabled in s. Every input action in A is enabled in all the states of A. A task C, which consists of a set of locally controlled actions, is said to be enabled in a state s iff some action in C is enabled in state s.
Intuitively, each step of the form (s, a, s ′ ) denotes the following behavior: the automaton A, in state s, performs action a and changes its state to s ′ .
Executions And Traces
Now we describe how an automaton executes. An execution fragment of an automaton A is a finite sequence s0, a1, s1, a2, . . . , s k−1 , a k , s k , or an infinite sequence s0, a1, s1, a2, . . . , s k−1 , a k , s k , . . ., of alternating states and actions of A such that for every k ≥ 0, action a k+1 is enabled in state s k . An execution fragment that starts with an initial state is called an execution. Each occurrence of an action in an execution fragment is said to be an event.
A trace of an execution denotes only the externally observable behavior. Formally, the trace t of an execution α is the subsequence of α consisting of all the external actions. We say that t is a trace of an automaton A if t is the trace of some execution of A. When referring to specific events in a trace, we use the following convention: if t contains at least x events, then t[x] denotes the x th event in the trace t, and otherwise, t[x] = ⊥. Throughout this article, we assume that no action is named ⊥.
It is useful to consider subsequences of traces that contain only certain events. We accomplish this through the notion of a projection. Given a sequence of actions t and a set of actions B, the projection of t over B, denoted t|B, is the subsequence of t consisting of exactly the events from B.
Composing I/O Automata
A collection of I/O automata may be composed by matching output actions of some automata with the same-named input actions of others. Specifically, each output of an automaton may be matched with same-named input of any number of other automata. Upon composition, all the actions with the same name are performed together.
Fairness
When considering executions of a composition of I/O automata, we are interested in the executions in which all the automata get fair turns to perform steps; such executions are called fair executions.
Recall that in each automaton, the locally controlled actions are partitioned into tasks. An execution fragment α of an automaton A is said to be a fair execution fragment iff the following two conditions hold for every task C in A.
(1) If α is finite, then no action in C is enabled in the final state of α. (2) If α is infinite, then either (a) α contains infinitely many events from C, or (b) α contains infinitely many occurrences of states in which C is not enabled.
A trace t of A is said to be a fair trace if t is the trace of a fair execution of A.
Deterministic Automata
We define an action a (of an automaton A) to be deterministic iff for every state s, there exists at most one transition of the form (s, a, s ′ ) in trans(A). We define an automaton A to be task deterministic iff (1) for every task C and every state s of A, at most one action in C is enabled in s, and (2) all the actions in A are deterministic. An automaton is said to be deterministic iff it is task deterministic, has exactly one task, and has a unique start state.
CRASH PROBLEMS
This section provides definitions of problems, distributed problems, crashes, crash problems and asynchronous failure detectors.
Problems
A problem P is a tuple (IP , OP , TP ) where IP and OP are disjoint sets of actions and TP is a set of (finite or infinite) sequences over these actions.
Distributed Problems. Here, we introduce a fixed finite set Π of n location IDs; we assume that Π does not contain the element ⊥.
For a problem P , we define a mapping loc : IP ∪ OP → Π ∪ {⊥} which associates an action to a location ID or ⊥. For an action a, if loc(a) = i and i ∈ Π, then a is said to occur at i. Problem P is said to be distributed over Π if, for every action a ∈ IP ∪ OP , loc(a) ∈ Π.
For convenience, the location of each action is included in the name of the action as a subscript; for instance, if an action a occurs at i, then the action is named ai.
Crash Problems. We posit the existence of a set of actions {crashi|i ∈ Π}, denotedÎ; according to our conventions loc(crashi) = i. A problem P ≡ (IP , OP , TP ) that is distributed over Π, is said to be a crash problem iff, for each i ∈ Π, crashi is an action in IP ; that is,Î ⊆ IP .
Given a sequence t ∈ TP , f aulty(t) denotes the set of locations at which a crash event occurs in t. Similarly, live(t) denotes the set of locations for which a crash event does not occur in t. The locations in f aulty(t) are said to be faulty in t, and the locations in live(t) are said to be live in t.
For convenience, we assume that for any two distinct crash problems P ≡ (IP , OP , TP ) and
The foregoing assumption simplifies the issues involving composition of automata; we discuss these in Section 5.
Asynchronous Failure Detectors
Recall that a failure detector is an oracle that provides information about crash failures. In our modeling framework, we view failure detectors as a special type of crash problems and are called asynchronous failure detectors. A necessary condition for a crash problem P ≡ (IP , OP , TP ) to be an asynchronous failure detector is crash exclusivity, which states that IP =Î; that is, the actions IP are exactly the crash actions. Crash exclusivity guarantees that the only inputs to a failure detector are the crash events, and hence, failure detectors provide information only about crashes. An asynchronous failure detector also satisfies additional properties, but before describing these properties formally we need some auxiliary definitions.
Let D ≡ (Î, OD, TD) be a crash problem. For each i ∈ Π, Fi is the set of actions in OD at i; thus, OD = ∪i∈ΠFi. We begin by defining the following terms. Let t be an arbitrary sequence overÎ ∪ OD.
Valid sequences. The sequence t is said to be valid iff (1) for every i ∈ Π, no event in OD occurs at i after a crashi event in t, and (2) if no crashi event occurs in t, then t contains infinitely many events in OD at i.
Sampling. A sequence t ′ is a sampling of t iff (1) t ′ is a subsequence t, (2) for every location i ∈ Π, (a) if i is live in t, then t ′ |F i = t|F i , and (b) if i is faulty in t, then i is faulty in t ′ and t ′ |F i is a prefix of t|F i . Constrained reordering. Let t ′ be a permutation of events in t; t ′ is constrained reordering of t iff, for every pair of events e and e ′ , if (1) e precedes e ′ in t and (2) either loc(e) = loc(e ′ ), or e ∈Î, then e precedes e ′ in t ′ as well. Now we define an asynchronous failure detector. A crash problem of the form D ≡ (Î, OD, TD) (which satisfies crash exclusivity) is an asynchronous failure detector (AFD, for short) iff D satisfies the following properties.
Validity. Every sequence t ∈ TD is valid. Closure Under Sampling. For every sequence t ∈ TD, every sampling of t is in TD.
Closure Under Constrained Reordering. For every sequence t ∈ TD, every constrained reordering of t is in TD.
A brief motivation for the above properties is in order. The validity property ensures that after a location crashes, no outputs occur at that location, and if a location does not crash, outputs occur infinitely often at that location. Closure under sampling permits a failure detector to 'skip' or 'miss' any suffix of outputs at a faulty location. Finally, closure under constrained reordering permits 'delaying' output events at any location.
Examples of AFDs
Here, we specify some of the failure detectors that are most widely used and cited in literature, as AFDs.
The Leader Election Oracle. Informally, Ω continually outputs a location ID at each location; eventually and permanently, Ω outputs the ID of a unique live location at all the live locations.
We specify our version of Ω ≡ (Î, OΩ, TΩ) as follows. The action set OΩ = ∪i∈ΠFi, where, for each i ∈ Π, Fi = {F D-Ω(j)i|j ∈ Π}. TΩ is the set of all valid sequences t over I ∪ OΩ that satisfy the following property: if live(t) = ∅, then there exists a location l ∈ live(t) and a suffix t suf f of t such that, t suf f |O Ω is a sequence over the set {F D-Ω(l)i|i ∈ live(t)}.
Perfect and Eventually Perfect Failure Detectors. Here we specify two popular failure detectors among the canonical failure detector from [5] : the perfect failure detector P and the eventually perfect failure detector ✸P. Informally, P never suspects any location (say) i until event crashi occurs, and it eventually and permanently suspects crashed locations; ✸P eventually and permanently never suspects live locations and eventually and permanently suspects faulty locations.
We specify our version of P ≡ (Î, OP , TP ) as follows. The action set OP = ∪i∈ΠFi, where, for each i ∈ Π, Fi = {F D-P(S)i|S ∈ 2 Π }. TP is the set of all valid sequences t overÎ ∪ OP that satisfy the following two properties. (1) For every prefix tpre of t, if i ∈ live(tpre), then for each j ∈ Π and for every event of the form F D-P(S)j in tpre, i / ∈ S. (2) There exists a suffix tsus of t such that, for every i ∈ f aulty(t), for each j ∈ Π, and for every event of the form F D-P(S)j in tsus, i ∈ S.
We specify our version ✸P ≡ (Î, O✸P , T✸P ) as follows. The action set O✸P = ∪i∈ΠFi, where, for each i ∈ Π, Fi = {F D-✸P(S)i|S ∈ 2 Π }. T✸P is the set of all valid sequences t overÎ ∪ O✸P that satisfy the following two properties.
(1) There exists a suffix ttrust of t such that, for every pair of locations i, j ∈ live(t), and for every event of the form F D-✸P(S)j in ttrust, i / ∈ S. (2) There exists a suffix tsus of t such that, for every i ∈ f aulty(t), for each j ∈ live(t), and for every event of the form F D-✸P(S)j in tsus, i ∈ S.
It is easy to see that Ω ≡ (Î, OΩ, TΩ), P ≡ (Î,Ô, TP ) and ✸P ≡ (Î,Ô, T✸P ) satisfy all the properties of an AFD and the proof of the aforementioned assertion is left as an exercise for the reader. Similarly, it is straightforward to specify failure detectors like Ω k and Ψ k as AFDs.
SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
An asynchronous system is modeled as the composition of a collection of the following I/O automata: process automata, channel automata, a crash automaton, and possibly other automata (including a failure-detector automata).
Process Automata. The system contains a collection of n process automata: one process automaton at each location. Each process automaton is a deterministic automaton whose actions occur at a single location. A process automaton whose actions occur at i is denoted proc(i). It has an input action crashi which is an output from the crash automaton; when crashi occurs, it permanently disables all locally controlled actions of proc(i). The process automaton proc(i) sends and receives messages through a set of output actions {send(m, j)i|m ∈ M∧j ∈ Π\{i}}, and a set of input actions {receive(m, j)i|m ∈ M ∧ j ∈ Π \ {i}}, respectively. In addition, process automata may interact with the environment automaton and other automata through additional actions.
A distributed algorithm A is a collection of process automata, one at each location; for convenience, we write Ai for the process automaton proc(i) at i.
Channel Automata. For every ordered pair (i, j) of distinct locations, the system contains a channel automaton Ci,j . The input actions are {send(m, j)i|m ∈ M}, which are outputs from the process automaton at i. The output actions are {receive(m, i)j| m ∈ M}, which are inputs to the process automaton at j. Each such channel automaton implements a reliable FIFO link.
Crash Automaton. The crash automaton contains the set {crashi|i ∈ Π} ≡Î of output actions and no input actions. Every sequence overÎ is a fair trace of the crash automaton.
Environment Automaton. The environment automaton, denoted E , models the external world with which the distributed system interacts. The external signature of the environment matches the input and output actions of the process automata that do not interact with other automata in the system. The set of fair traces that constitute the externally observable behavior of E specifies "well-formedness" restrictions, which vary from one system to another. Other Automata. The system may contain other automata with which the process automata and the crash automaton interact. Typically, these automata solve a crash problem, as defined in the next section.
SOLVING PROBLEMS
In this section, we define what it means for an automaton to solve a crash problem and for a distributed algorithm to solve a crash problem. We also define what it means for a system to solve a crash problem P using another crash problem P ′ . We use the aforementioned definitions to define what it means for an AFD to be sufficient to solve a crash problem, and vice versa.
Solving a Crash Problem
An automaton U solves a crash problem P ≡ (IP , OP , TP ) in an environment E , if (1) the input actions of U are IP , and the output actions of U are OP , (2) the input actions of E are OP , and the output actions of E are IP \Î, and (3) the set of fair traces of the composition of U , E , and the crash automaton is a subset of TP .
A distributed algorithm A solves a crash problem P in an environment E (or, A solves P in E ), iff the automaton A, which is obtained by composing A with the channel automata, solves P in E . A crash problem P is said to be solvable in an environment E , iff there exists a distributed algorithm A such that A solves P in E . If a crash problem is not solvable in E , then it is said to be unsolvable in E .
Using One Crash Problem to Solve Another
Often, an unsolvable crash problem P may be solvable in a system that contains an automaton that solves some other unsolvable crash problem P ′ . We describe the relationship between P and P ′ as follows. A distributed algorithm A solves a crash problem P using another crash problem P ′ in an environment E (or succinctly, A solves P using P ′ in E ), iff the following is true. LetÂ be the composition of A with the channel automata, the crash automaton, and the environment E . For every fair trace t ofÂ, if t|I P ′ ∪O P ′ ∈ T P ′ , then t|I P ∪O P ∈ TP .
We say that a crash problem P ′ ≡ (I P ′ , O P ′ , T P ′ ) is sufficient to solve a crash problem P ≡ (IP .OP , TP ), in environment E , denoted P ′ E P iff there exists a distributed algorithm A that solves P using P ′ in E . If P ′ E P , then also we say that P is solvable using P ′ in E . If no such distributed algorithm exists, then we state that P is unsolvable using P ′ in E , and we denote it as P ′ E P . It is worth noting that in the foregoing definition, the problems P and P ′ must be distinct in order for automata composition to be applicable. However, it is useful to consider problems that are "sufficient to solve themselves"; that is, given a crash problem P and an environment E , it is useful to define the following relation: P E P . We do so using the notion of renaming.
Renaming and Self-Implementability
A crash problem P ′ ≡ (I P ′ , O P ′ , T P ′ ) is said to be a renaming of a crash problem P ≡ (IP , OP , TP ) iff (1) (IP ∪ OP ) ∩ (I P ′ ∪ O P ′ ) =Î, and there exist bijections rIO : IP ∪ OP → I P ′ ∪ O P ′ and rT : TD → T D ′ such that, (1) for each a ∈Î, rIO(a) = a, for each a ∈ IP \Î, rIO(a) ∈ I P ′ \Î, for each a ∈ OP , rIO(a) ∈ O P ′ , (2) for each action a ∈ IP ∪ OP , loc(a) = loc(rIO(a)), and (3) for each t ∈ TP and for each
). Now, we can define the solvability of a crash problem P using itself as follows. We say that a crash problem P is self-implementable in environment E , denoted P E P , iff there exists a renaming P ′ of P such that P E P ′ .
Using and Solving AFDs
Since an AFD is simply a kind of crash problem, we have automatic definitions for the following notions. We remark that when we talk about solving an AFD, the environment E has no output actions because the AFD has no input actions except forÎ, which are inputs from the crash automaton. Therefore, we have the following lemma. Lemma 1. For a crash-problem P , an AFD D, and an environment E , if P E D, then for any other environment E ′ with the same external signature as E , P E ′ D.
Consequently, when we refer to an AFD D being solvable using a crash problem (or an AFD) P , we generally omit the reference to the environment automaton and simply say that P is sufficient to solve D; we denote this relationship by P D. Analogously, when we refer to a D being unsolvable using P , we denote this relationship by P D. 
Finally, if an AFD

SELF-IMPLEMENTABILITY OF AFDS
Within the traditional definitions of failure detectors, it is well known that not all failure detectors self-implementable (see [6] for a detailed discussion). In contrast we show that every AFD is self-implementable. Recall that an AFD D is self-implementable, denoted D D, iff there exists a renaming D ′ of D such that D D ′ . Algorithm For Self-Implementability. We provide a distributed algorithm A self that demonstrates self implementability of an arbitrary AFD D. First, we fix an arbi- at each location i. Signature:
f dq: queue of elements from OD, initially empty f ailed: Boolean, initially f alse Actions:
Correctness. The proof of correctness follows from closure under sampling and closure under constrained reordering, but is omitted due to space constraints. An immediate consequence of Corollary 3 is that we can take the union of the relation between distinct AFDs and the relation comparing an AFD and claim that the relation is transitive. This is captured in the following lemma. 
AFDS AND OTHER CRASH PROBLEMS
In this section, we explore the relative solvability among AFDs and the consequences of such relative solvability on other crash problems that can be solved using AFDs. Section 7.1 shows that if an AFD D ′ is strictly stronger than another AFD D, then the set of problems that D ′ can solve in a given environment is a strict superset of the set of problems solvable by D in the same environment. Section 7.2 revisits the traditional notion of a weakest failure detector for a problem and defines what it means for an AFD to be a weakest to solve a crash problem in a given set of environments. We also introduce the notion of an AFD begin representative of a problem in a given set of environments. Section 7.3 shows that a large class of problems, which we call finite problems, do not have a representative AFD.
Comparing AFDs
Traditionally, as defined in [4] , a failure detector D is stronger than a failure detector D ′ if D is sufficient to solve D ′ . This definition immediately implies that every problem solvable in some environment using D ′ is also solvable in the same environment using D. However, this definition does not imply the converse; if in every environment every problem solvable using D ′ is also solvable using D, then it is not necessarily the case that D is stronger than D ′ . We demonstrate that in our framework, the converse must also be true; that is, given two AFDs D and D ′ , every crash problem solvable using D ′ in a some environment is also solvable using D in the same environment iff D is stronger than D ′ . This is captured by the following theorem: the construction of A P , we have that t|I P ∪O P ∈ TP , which immediately implies D E P .
Claim 2:
The theorem follows directly from Claims 1 and 2.
Corollary 6. Given two AFDs D and D ′ where D ≻ D ′ , there exists a crash problem P and an environment E such that D E P , but D ′ E P ; that is, there exists some problem P and an environment E such that D is sufficient to solve P in E , but D ′ is not sufficient to solve P in E .
By the contrapositive of Theorem 5, there exists a problem P and an environment E such that D E P and D ′ E P .
Weakest and Representative AFDs
The issue of weakest failure detectors for problems was originally tackled in [4] in which a failure detector D is defined as a weakest to solve a problem P if the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) D is sufficient to solve P , and (2) any failure detector D ′ that is sufficient to solve P is stronger than D. This definition can be directly translated to our framework as follows.
An AFD D is weakest for a crash problem P in an environment E iff (1) D E P and (2) for every AFD
An AFD D is a weakest for a crash problem P in a set of environments E iff for every E ∈ E, D is weakest for P in E .
There have been many results that demonstrate weakest failure detectors for various problems. The proof techniques used to demonstrate these results have been of two distinct styles. The first proof technique was first proposed in [4] and is as follows. To show that DP , which is sufficient to solve P , is the weakest failure detector to solve problem P it considers an arbitrary failure detector D that is sufficient to solve the problem P using an algorithm A. It then constructs a distributed algorithm that exchanges the failure detector D's outputs and then continually simulates runs of A using the set of D's outputs available so far. From these simulations, an admissible output for DP is extracted. This proof technique has been used to determine a weakest failure detector for the so-called one-shot problems such as consensus [4] and k-set consensus [11] .
The second proof technique is simpler and follows from mutual reducibility. To show that DP , which is sufficient to solve P , is the weakest failure detector to solve problem P , it uses a solution to P as a 'black box' to design a distributed algorithm whose outputs satisfy DP . This proof technique has been used to determine a weakest failure detector for long-lived problems such as mutual exclusion [9, 2] , contention managers [12] , and dining philosophers [22] .
A natural question is, "does the mutual-reducibility based proof technique work for determining weakest failure detectors for one-shot problems?" We answer this question negatively by introducing the notion of a representative AFD.
Representative AFD. Informally, an AFD is representative of a crash problem if the AFD can be used to solve the crash problem and conversely, a solution to the problem can be used to solve (or implement) the AFD.
Formally, an AFD D is representative of a problem P in an environment E iff D E P and P D. An AFD D is representative of problem P in a set of environments E iff for every environment E ∈ E, D is representative of P in E .
Observe that if an AFD D is representative of a crash problem P in E, then D is also a weakest AFD to solve P in E. However, the converse need not be true. Specifically if D is a weakest AFD to solve problem P in E, it is not necessary for D to be representative of P in E.
In particular, we highlight that the weakest failure detector results in [23, 22, 13] establish that the eventually perfect failure detector is representative for eventually fair schedulers, dining under eventual weak exclusion, and boosting obstruction-freedom to wait-freedom, respectively.
Next, we show that a large class of problems (which we call finite problems) do not have a representative failure detector despite having a weakest failure detector.
Finite Problems and Representative AFDs
In this subsection we define the notion of a finite problem, which captures what is often referred to as one-shot problems. Informally speaking, finite problems are those that have a bounded number of interactions with the environment. Examples of finite problems include consensus, leader election, terminating reliable broadcast, and k-set agreement. Examples of problems that are not finite problems include mutual exclusion, Dining Philosophers, synchronizers, and other long-lived problems.
Before we define finite problems we need some auxiliary definitions. A problem P is crash independent if, for every finite prefix tpre of a trace t ∈ TP , tpre| I P ∪O P \Î is a finite prefix of some t ′ ∈ TP such that t ′ |Î is empty. In other words, for every prefix tpre of every trace t ∈ TP , the subsequence of tpre consisting of exactly the non-crash events is a prefix of some crash-free trace in TP . For each t ∈ TP , let len(t) denote the length of the subsequence of t that consists of all non-crash events. A problem P has bounded length if there exists a bP ∈ N + such that, for every t ∈ TP , len(t) ≤ bP . If a problem P is crash independent and has bounded length we say that P is a finite problem.
Before we state the main theorem of this section, recall that an unsolvable problem is one that cannot be solved in a purely asynchronous system (i.e. without failure detectors).
Theorem 7. If P is a finite problem that is unsolvable in an environment E then P does not have a representative AFD in E .
Proof sketch. Suppose by contradiction that P is a finite problem that is unsolvable in an environment E , and some AFD D is representative of P in E . Therefore, there exists a distributed algorithm A P that uses P to solve D, and conversely there exists a distributed algorithm A D which uses D to solve P in E . First we state the following lemma. Before proving Lemma 8, we show why it implies the theorem. From Lemma 8, and crash independence of P , it follows that for any fair execution α ′ (and its associated trace t ′ ) of A that extends α ref then t ′ |I P ∪O P ∈ TP . Since A solves D using P we have that t ′ |I D ∪O D ∈ TD. For each i ∈ Π, let si be the state of process automaton at i at the end of α ref and let fi denote the sequence of events from OD at location i in α ref . Next, we describe a distributed algorithm A ′ which, in every fair execution, guarantees that each process i will first output the sequence fi and then behave as A P would behave when starting at state si.
The distributed algorithm A ′ which is identical to A P except in the following ways at each i ∈ Π. Lemma 9. For every fair execution α (and its trace t) of A ′ with the channel automata and the crash automaton, there exists a fair execution α A P (and its trace t A P ) of the composition of A P with the crash automaton, and the channel automaton where t A P |I P ∪O P ∈ TP such that the following is true. Lemma 9 implies that any fair execution α of A ′ produces a trace t such that t|I D ∪O D ∈ TD, and therefore A ′ solves D. Therefore, by composing A ′ i and A P i (and their respective channel automata) at each location i , we obtain a distributed algorithm that solves P in E ; that is, P is solvable in E . But P is assumed to be unsolvable in E . Thus, we have a contradiction, and that completes the proof of Theorem 7.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let σ be the set of all fair executions of A such that for any trace t produced by an execution in σ it is true that t|I P ∪O P ∈ TP . Let αmax be an execution in σ which produces the trace tmax that maximizes len(tmax|I P ∪O P ).
Let αs.pre be the shortest prefix of the execution αmax which contains all events of IP ∪ OP . Since P is bounded length it follows that such a prefix exists and is finite, and furthermore, any extension of αs.pre does not include any events from IP ∪ OP \Î because len(tmax|I P ∪O P ) is maximal. We extend αs.pre to another finite execution αpre by appending receive events for every message that is in transit at the end of αs.pre such so that no message is in transit (and the channels are 'quiescent') at the end of αpre Let ΠC be the set of crashed locations in αpre, and observe that by assumption after the first crashi event in αpre, proc(i) does not perform any outputs in αpre. Let α ref be identical to αpre except that all crash events have been removed. For a location i / ∈ ΠC the executions αpre and α ref are indistinguishable, and therefore proc(i) must produce the same output in both executions. For a location i ∈ ΠC the executions αpre and α ref are indistinguishable up to the point where the first event crashi occurs in αpre, and after that point there is no other output at i in αpre; therefore proc(i) must produce the same output in both executions. Thus, α ref is a finite crash-free execution that fulfills the requirements for the lemma.
WEAKEST AFD FOR CONSENSUS
In a seminal result [4] , Chandra et. al. established that Ω is a weakest failure detector to solve crash-tolerant binary consensus. Recasting the arguments from [4] in our modeling framework yields a simpler proof. The proof is split into two parts, which we discuss separately.
In the first part, as in [4] , we construct a tree of possible executions of an AFD-based solution to consensus. However, in [4] , each edge of such a tree corresponds to a single event whereas in our framework, each edge corresponds to a task, which represents a collection of events. Therefore, we reduce the number of cases for which we have analyze the tree. Specifically, we look for transitions from a bivalent to a monovalent execution.
2 Furthermore, the proof in [4] considers a forest of executions, where each tree in the forest corresponds to a single configuration of the inputs to consensus. In contrast, our framework treats inputs for consensus as events that are performed by the environment automaton. Therefore, we need analyze only a single tree of executions. These, two factors simplify the analysis of AFD-based consensus significantly and yield the following (paraphrased) claim, which may be of independent interest.
Claim. In the tree of all possible executions of a system solving consensus using an AFD, the events responsible for the transition from a bivalent to a univalent execution occur at a live location.
The second part of the proof uses the above claim to show that Ω is a weakest AFD to solve consensus. The arguments are similar to the ones presented in [4] , but are simplified by the above claim.
As in [4] , we present a distributed algorithm A Ω which receives the outputs from the AFD D (which is sufficient to solve consensus) and solves Ω. The process automata exchange the AFD outputs among each other. Based on their current knowledge of the AFD outputs at various locations, A Ω i at each location i continually determines a finite "canonical" FD sequence, denoted ti, which is a prefix of some sequence in TD. Furthermore, as the execution proceeds, A Ω i at each location i obtains increasingly longer sequences of AFD outputs from other locations. Thus, at each live location i, A Ω i constructs increasingly longer canonical FD sequences ti. Eventually, at each live location i, ti converges to some unique sequence in t ref ∈ TD. More importantly, for any finite prefix tpre of t ref , eventually and permanently, the canonical sequences ti at each live location i are extensions of tpre.
2 Briefly, an execution of the system is v-valent (where v is either 0 or 1) if the only possible decision at each location, in the execution or any fair extension of the execution, is v. A v-valent execution is monovalent. If an execution is not monovalent, then it is bivalent. Periodically, at each location i, A Ω i uses its canonical sequence ti to construct a finite tree of executions of depth di, where di is the length of ti. From this tree, it determines the "earliest" transition from a bivalent execution to a monovalent execution of consensus. The location of the process associated with this transition is provided as the output of Ω at i. Note that the earliest such transition in the tree of executions is determined uniquely by the nodes within some finite depth (say) d of the tree. Let t pre.d be the prefix of t ref of length d. Eventually and permanently, the canonical sequence ti at each live location are extensions of t pre.d . Therefore, eventually and permanently, A Ω i at every live location i determines the same "earliest" transition from a bivalent execution to a monovalent execution of consensus. From the claim established in the first part, we know that the the events responsible for the "earliest" transition from a bivalent to a univalent execution occur at a some live location (say) l. Therefore, eventually and permanently, A Ω i at every live location i determines l to be the output of the Ω AFD, which is a unique correct location. Thus A Ω implements the Ω AFD using D. Thus, we show that Ω is a weakest AFD for consensus.
DISCUSSION
Query-Based Failure Detectors. Our framework models failure detectors as crash problems that interact with process automata unilaterally. In contrast, many traditional models of failure detectors employ a query-based interaction [4, 17] . Since the inputs to AFDs are only the crash events, the information provided by AFDs can only be about process crashes. In contrast, query-based failure detectors receive inputs from the crash events and the process automata. The inputs from process automata may "leak" information about other events in the system to the failure detectors We illustrate the ability of query-based failure detectors to provide such additional information with the following example.
Applying Theorem 7 we know that consensus does not have representative failure detectors. However, if we consider the universe of query-based failure detectors, we see that consensus has a representative query-based failure detector, which we call a participant failure detector. A participant failure detector outputs the same location ID to all queries at all times and guarantees that the process automaton whose associated ID is output has queried the failure detector at least once (observe that this does not imply that said location does not crash, just that the location was not crashed initially).
It is easy to see how we can solve consensus using the participant failure detector. Each process automaton sends its proposal to all the process automata before querying the failure detector. The output of the failure detector must be a location whose process automaton has already sent its proposal to all the process automata. Therefore, each process automaton simply waits to receive the proposal from the process automaton whose associated location ID is output by the failure detector and then decide on that proposal.
Similarly, solving participant failure detector from a solution to consensus is also straightforward. The failure detector implementation is as follows. Upon receiving a query, the process automaton inputs its location ID as the proposal to the solution to consensus. Eventually, the consensus solution decides on some proposed location ID, and therefore, the ID of some location whose process automaton queried the fail-ure detector implementation. In response to all queries, the implementation simply returns the location ID decided by the consensus solution.
Thus, we see that query-based failure detectors may provide information about events other than crashes. Furthermore, unlike representative failure detectors, a representative query-based failure detector for some problem P is not guaranteed to be a weakest failure detector for problem P . In conclusion, we argue that unilateral interaction for failure detectors is more reasonable than a query-based interaction.
Future Work. Our work introduces AFDs, but the larger impact of AFD-based framework on the existing results from traditional failure-detector theory needs to be assessed. The exact set of failure detectors than can be specified as AFDs remains to determined. It remains to be seen if weakest failure detectors for various problems are specifiable as AFDs, and if not, then the weakest AFDs to solve these problems are yet to be determined. We are yet to investigate if the results in [17] hold true for AFDs and if every problem (as defined in [17] ) has a weakest AFD. The exact characterization of problems that have a representative AFD and the problems that do not have a representative AFD is unknown.
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